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The court applied both section 42-1426(2) and section 42-1416 (repealed) to A & B's proposed enlargement, treating the source of the
enlargement as groundwater. Both sections prohibit a proposed
enlarged water right that injures junior appropriators. The court held
that, under the Freemont-Madisondecision, proposed enlargements constitute per se injuries to junior appropriators. Treating A & B's proposed enlargement as a per se injury to junior appropriators, the court
ruled that section 42-1426(2) requires that an injurious enlargement
must become subordinate to a junior right by advancing its priority
date to a date one day later than the junior appropriator's priority
date. The court also noted that, even though the district court declared section 42-1416 unconstitutional, A & B still would not receive
the statute's rebuttable presumption because of its per se injury to junior appropriators. In applying both the current and repealed version
of the Idaho statute, the court held all proposed enlargements must be
subordinate to junior rights, since a per se injury to junior appropriators
cannot by definition be mitigated.
The court held that the Groundwater Users' recommendation in
support of IDWR's Amended Director's Report was a sufficient procedural action to preserve and establish the Groundwater Users' interests
and rights in the case.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Groundwater Users, the
State, and the Groundwater Districts.
ChristopherJensen
ILLINOIS
Valstad v. Cipriano, 828 N.E.2d 854 (II. App. Ct. 2005) (holding the
state's imposition of fees on NPDES permit holders is justified and is
not preempted by the federal Clean Water Act where a legally sufficient justification exists which is reasonably related to the legislative
purpose and it advances the objective of the imposing Act).
The Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 93-32 ("Public
Act"), effective in relevant partJuly 1, 2003. The Public Act added section 12.5 to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act ("Act") requiring
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("Illinois EPA") to collect annual fees from certain holders of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits. In June 2003, the Illinois EPA
requested such fees from Harold Valstad, the owner and operator of
Valstad Quarry, Inc., and 40 other quarry owners (collectively "Valstad"). Valstad paid the fees under protest. In August 2003, Valstad
filed a revised complaint against the Illinois EPA director, Renee
Cipriano ("Cipriano"), the Illinois EPA, and the Illinois State Treas-
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urer alleging, in part, that section 12.5 of the Act violated 1) the uniformity clause, equal protection clause, and the due-process clause of
the Illinois Constitution; 2) the Federal Clean Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act ("CWA") under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution; and 3) regulations promulgated under the
CWA. In September 2003, the Circuit Court of Sangamon County
granted Cipriano's motion to dismiss. Valstad appealed the dismissal
to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
Valstad argued that section 12.5 of the Act violated the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution because there is no real and substantial difference between private and governmental agencies or between
point sources of pollutants and non-point sources of pollutants. To
survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, the fee classification must
be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed
and those not taxed and bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. Additionally, the scope of
inquiry under the uniformity clause is relatively narrow and the court is
not required to have perfect rationality as to each and every fee payer.
The court rejected Valstad's argument, finding a legally sufficient justification existed for the imposition of fees on aggregate mines holding
NPDES permits, and that a real and substantial difference existed between governmental and private NPDES permit holders.
In support of the first claim, Valstad contended the Act violated the
uniformity clause because no real and substantial difference existed
between private aggregate mines, which are required to have NPDES
permits and pay fees, and Illinois public school districts, which are required to have NPDES permits but are not required to pay fees. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that section 12.5 of the Act specifically excludes the state or any department or agency of the state, as
well as any school district from NPDES permit fees. Furthermore, because the purpose of the Public Act is to increase state revenue for
both the CWA fund and the general revenue fund, imposing a fee on
school districts would not advance the objective of the Public Act. Accordingly, the court found a real and substantial difference existed
between the fee-paying aggregate mines and non fee-paying school
districts that was reasonably related to the legislative purpose of the
Public Act.
Second, Valstad contended that no real and substantial difference
existed between aggregate mines, which constitute point sources of
pollutants, and entities which constitute non-point-sources of pollutants. In its defense, Cipriano explained that the CWA requires point
sources of pollutants to obtain NPDES permits, but it does not require
non-point sources of pollutants to hold such permits. As a result, the
Illinois EPA bears expenses in administering the NPDES permits to
point sources of pollutants whereas it bears no expense on behalf of
non-point sources of pollutants. Furthermore, Cipriano argued if the

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

court interpreted the uniformity clause to mandate administration on
non-point sources of pollutants it would defeat the purpose of the Public Act, to increase revenue. The court agreed with Cipriano, finding a
real and substantial difference existed between point sources of pollutants and non-point sources of pollutants that was reasonably related to
the legislative purpose of the Act.
Next, Valstad argued that section 12.5's imposition of fees was not
reasonably related to the purpose of the Act because the $26 million
generated by the imposed fees exceeded the $6.4 million costs of clean
water activities. Rejecting this argument, the court noted the costs of
clean water activities did not reflect the state's total expenditures for
such activities, including overhead and expenditures. Additionally, the
transfer of money from a special fund to a general revenue fund is
generally within the legislature's authority, and Valstad received a
benefit from the expenditures made out of the general revenue fund.
Moreover, the uniformity clause does not require the taxed group to
be the sole or even primary beneficiary of the tax.
Valstad further contended, based on the supremacy clause of the
U. S. Constitution, that the CWA preempts the imposition of fees under section 12.5. First, Valstad argued section 301(o) of the CWA,
which prescribes fees for applications for modification, expressly preempts the imposition of NPDES permit fees. Unpersuaded, the court
held that the requirement of fees under one section of the CWA does
not, by itself, expressly preclude states from imposing fees upon
NPDES permit holders. Valstad's argument that the CWA is so comprehensive so as to exclude any state regulation also did not persuade
the court. Instead, it noted Congress intended that the states retain
much of the authority for administration and enforcement of the
NPDES permit program. Under the same analysis, the court rejected
Valstad's third argument and held that Congress' decision to affirmatively decline to restrict the availability of NPDES permits to those with
thousands of dollars to spare does not preempt the states from imposing NPDES permit fees, reiterating that Congress intended that each
state assume responsibility for its own NPDES program.
Finally, relying on section 123.62 of the Code of Federal Regulation ("section 123.62 "), Valstad argued that the imposition of fees under section 12.5 of the Act is a violation of the regulations promulgated
under the CWA in that it constitutes a revision of the Illinois NPDES
permit program, which requires approval by the United States EPA
administrator. Referring to the language of section 123.62, the court
found that the imposition of permit fees does not rise to the level of
"revision" as implied in that section. For initial approval of a state's
NPDES program, a large amount of information is required; however,
a state is not required to submit its NPDES permit-fee structure at that
time. Accordingly, the court held it would not stand to reason that a
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state would later be required to submit information regarding its permit fees.
Unpersuaded by Valstad's arguments, the court affirmed the motion to dismiss.
Kelly L. Snodgrass

INDIANA
Parkison v. McCue, 831 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment on grounds that: (1) title to
lands submerged under water reverted to the state; (2) easements over
such lands were terminated; (3) accretion caused title of such land to
revert to original riparian owner free of easements; and (4) constructing piers over beach easements severely limited the rights of riparian
owners and rendered the easement appreciably less useful for other
easement holders).
Lakefront lot owners filed an ejectment and trespass suit when
back lot owners constructed a pier over an easement bordering Clear
Lake. The lakefront lot owners argued that flooding extinguished the
easement bordering lakefront properties and neighboring back lot
owners must remove the pier built over that easement. In response,
Andrew Parkison argued that the back lot owner's easement still existed and that the easement language unambiguously granted pier
rights, or in the alternative, if the language was ambiguous, then evidence showed the grantor's intent to provide pier rights. On motions
for summary judgment from both parties, the Steuben County Superior Court held flooding did not terminate the easement and the plain
language of the easement prohibited construction of a pier. On appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, Parkison argued that the trial
court erred in determining the scope of the easement because the language of the easement was ambiguous. On cross-appeal, the lakefront
lot owners argued that the trial court erred in finding that flooding did
not extinguish an easement.
The court began by noting that easements over lands with riparian
rights do not necessarily entitle easement holders to use of those riparian rights. The court determined that it must interpret the language of
the deed granting the easement to find which rights the grantor provided for the easement holders. The court addressed the lakefront
property owners' argument to determine if an easement existed to interpret. The court viewed flooding as a temporary condition that subsides as water levels recede. However, because the lakefront lot owners
provided evidence showing the easement in question had been under
water since 2002, the court held that it was not a temporary condition
of flooding. Parkison asserted that the easement over the land re-

